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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE J. ALLEN, for himself and all other 
residents and taxpayers of Tooele County, 
Utah, similarly situated, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah; GEORGE WILLIS SMITH, 
GEORGE BUZIANIS and R. STERLING 
HALLADAY, individually and as members of 
the Board of Commissioners of Tooele County; 
ENERGY LEASING SERVICES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation; and THE · MAGNESI-
UM PROJECT, a joint venture, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11297 
Brief of Defendants and Respondents 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a class action for a declaratory judgment de-
termining questions of constitutionality and interpreta-
tion of a state statute and actions taken and to be taken 
by the defendants and respondents pursuant to authority 
contained in the statute. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, without a jury, was presented docu-
inrintary and testimonial evidence and entered judgment 
1 
in favor of defendants and respondents holding that the 
Utah Industrial Facilities Development Act (Chapter ~9 
Laws of Utah 1967; Title 11, Chapter 17 Utah Code An-
1 
notated, 1953 Supp., herein referred to as the "Act") 
is constitutional and that certain agreements between the 
defendants and actions proposed to be taken pursuant 
to these agreements including the issuance of rennue 
bonds by Tooele County are lawful and valid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept the statement of facts of Appel-
lant with the following clarifications and additions: 
-While Tooele County has little available excess hous-
ing, presently has a low unemployment rate and would 
need to provide additional public services such as schools 
and sewage systems, the construction of these new facili-
ties would in itself be a major boon to the ToOPle County 
economy (Tr. 20). The proposed electroytic mi1wrals 
extraction plant for the production of magnesium, chlor-
ine and related products from the waters of Great Salt 
Lake will initially cost between $52 million and $fi0 mil-
lion. There was no evidence that the defondants conk! 
arrange financing in some other way than by the i~sn­
ance of industrial revenue bonds although National Lead 
Company, one of the partners in The l\Iagiwsinm Projl'ct. 
is a substantial company financially. rJ1here was evidt'Jlf'I° I 
2 
that cost is a major factor in the establishment of a 
project such as this and that savings in financing costs 
which might be accomplished by industrial revenue bond 
financing is a major inducf~ment to the establishment of 
the project in the first instance (Tr. 36). The court can 
take jndicial notice of substantial increases in interest 
rates nationally, an increase experienced in the municipal 
bond market, in the industrial revenue bond market and 
in the corporate bond market. 
·while Tooele County has agreed (Ex. P-2) to in-
vestigate the feasibility of the project and make general 
snrveys in this regard, it has not expended tax moneys 
for this purpose nor does it expect to do so (Tr. 16, 21-22). 
II snch costs are incurred, the County would be reirn-
lmrsed out of the proceeds of the sale of the revenue 
bonds (Para. 4.3, Ex. D-4). 
The financing program briefly stated will involve 
entering into a lease and agreement between the County 
and either Energy Leasing Services, Inc., or The Mag-
nesium Project or their successors or assigns. The lease 
form will be substantially in the form of Exhibit D-4. 
lf tl1e lease is made with Energy Leasing Services, Inc., 
this wm be done to provide additional financing to the 
backers of the project and a sublease substantially in the 
form of Exhibit D-7 will be entered into. The County 
will also enter into the mortgage and indenture of trust 
in substantially the form of Exhibit D-5 and pursuant 
thereto will issue revenue bonds secured by a mortgage 
on tlw project and by a pledge of the revenues from the 
]lroject consisting of the rentals payable under the lease. 
3 
The bonds will be purchased by Goodbody & Co. punm-
ant to Exhibit P-3. Unconditional guarantee of payment 
of the bonds or of the rentals from either The Magnesium 
Project, H-K, Inc., National Lead Company or from any 
of them may be required if the backers of the project are 
not otherwise directly responsible for payment of the 
rentals under the lease. The lease continues and the ob-
ligation to pay rentals continues in all events until the 
principal and interest and all other costs incident to the 
bonds (such as trustees' fees, redemptoin premiums, etc.) 
are fully paid. The lease can be terminated only when 
the bonds are paid or provision for their payment is 
satisfactorily made (Article XI of Exhibit D-4). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEBT LIMIT AND BOND ELECTION RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARE NOT VIOLATED BY THE ISSUANCE OF 
REVENUEBONDSUNDERTHEACT 
The Act specifically provides (11-17-4) that revenue 
bonds issued under the Act "shall be limited obligations 
of the municipality or county [and] shall not constitute 
nor give rise to a general obligation or liability of the 
municipality or county or a charge against its general 
credit or taxing powers." Further, 11-17-5 provides that 
the bonds must be secured by a pledge and assignment 
of the revenues out of which the bonds are to be payable 
and may be secured by other security devices such as a 
mortgage or by a pledge of the lease of the project. rrhe 
county or the municipality may also make other cove-
nants or agreements with the bondholders and the lesser 
4 
of the lease of the project "except that in making any 
such agreements or provisions a municipality or county 
shall not have the power to obligate itself except with 
respect to the project and the application of the revenues 
from it and shall not have the power to incur a general 
obligation or liability or a charge upon its general credit 
or against its taxing powers." To make these restrictions 
doubly effective the Act also provides in 11-17-5( 4) that 
no breach of any agreement with the bondholders or 
with the lessee of a project "shall impose any general 
obligation or liability upon the municipality or county 
or any charge upon their general credit or against their 
taxing pO\Yers." 
r:rh(~ Respondents have fully complied with these re-
8trictions. The lease (Ex. D-4) obligates the County to 
issue revenue bonds to finance the construction of The 
Magnesium Project plant and facilities and to use the 
proceeds of the bonds solely for that purpose. The 
County is not obligated beyond the amount of bond 
proceeds available for the purpose of constructing the 
project (Sec. 4.6, Ex. D-4). On the other hand, the lease 
obligates the lessee to pay rent equal to the principal 
and interest due on the bonds as and when they become 
dnc plns any other expenses incident to the issuance and 
payment of the bonds including redemption premiums, 
trustees' fees and the like (Sec. 5.3 of Ex. D-4). The 
obligation to pay this rent is unconditional until all of 
the honds are fully paid. This is a so-called "hell and 
high water" lease, which gives no excuse for nonpayment 
of rent whatsoever. Specifically, there is no excuse if 
tl1e project is not completed, if the project is totally 
5 
destroyed or condemned, if there is a change in any , 
laws or even if the County fails to perform any of th~ 
limited agreements it will make. 
The agreements between the bondholders and the 
County are set forth in the mortgage and indenture of 
trust (Ex. D-5). Here it is crystal clear that the bond- , 
holders have no rights against the County which would 
involve any tax moneys of the County or any of the other 
funds belonging to the County other than the funds aris-
ing from payment of the rentals by the lessee of the 
project. As required by the Act, the bond form at pagP , 
7 of Exhibit D-5 provides specifically that the bonds and 
the interest due on the bonds do not and shall newr 
constitute an indebtedness of the County nor a charge 
against the general credit or taxing powers of the County. 
The bonds are to be payable "solely out of the revemws 
and other amounts derived out of the sale or leasing of 
the Project financed through the issuance of the Bonds 
and which has been leased to the Lessee." The provisions 
of the mortgage and indenture confirm these limitations 
(e.g., Ex. D-5: Sec. 203, p. 24; Sec. 401, p. 34; Sec. 1400, 
p. 69). 
The effect of the Act and the use of the Act by the 
County in connection with The Magnesimn Project is to 
authorize issuance of only revenue bonds, limited ohli-
gations issued in the name of the County but cr<>ating 
no debt or liability against the County or any tax rnonPY' 
of the County. 
The bonds fit within the well recognized "special fund 
docrtine" which has long been the law of this State anil 
6 
almost all other states (72 A.L.R. 687; 96 A.L.R. 1385; 
] 4G A.L.R 331) and which holds that obligations not pay-
able from tax moneys are not debts within the meaning 
of state constitutional debt limit and bond election re-
rp1irements. In Utah this principle was established in 
Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929), 
and has been adhered to in the subsequent cases of Fjeld-
sted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144; Wadsworth 
L'. Sa11taq11in City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161; Utah Power 
& Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P.2d 1191; 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 
P.2<l Gl; and Barlow v. Clearfield City, 1 U.2d 419, 268 
P.2d 682. The same principle has been applied and ex-
panded with regard to revenue bonds issued by the state 
for university purposes (Spence v. Utah State Agricul-
tural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18; Conder v. Uni-
rersity of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367). The rule 
applies \Vhen, as here, the sole source of payment to the 
bondholders is the revenues produced from property 
purchased out of the proceeds of the bonds or payable 
from the property itself. There is no debt created in 
the constitutional sense nor is there any requirement 
that the taxpayers must approve the issuance of the 
bonds. This is so because the bondholders cannot look to 
any tax money as a source of payment for the bonds. As 
the court stated in Barnes v. Lehi City, supra, 
In the instant case, impounding the earnings 
of the electric light and power plant in a special 
fund which is expressly pledged for the purpose 
of maintaining the plant and the payment of the 
interest and purchase price installments as they 
accrue under the proposed contract casts no addi-
7 
tional burden on the taxpayers of Lehi City .... 
The credit of the city is not extended, nor is any 
money which is derived from taxation or other 
existing sources of revenue expended, in the pur-
chase price or maintenance cost of the plant. The 
city cannot be coerced to applying any part of ib 
general revenue for the payment of the purchase 
price of the plant or for any part of the cost of 
maintenance thereof. Id., 279 Pac. at 885. 
In this case, the framework under which the finan-
cing program will proceed is similarly limited. The bond-
holders are told and retold that their only source of 
payment is the lease revenues paid by the lessee, that 
their only remedy is against the fund arising from ren-
tals paid under this lease and against the property com-
prising the project and its facilities and equipment. Bond 
proceeds, not tax money, are nsed to construct the project 
The County can in no event be sued for any money judg-
ment if the bonds are not paid nor is it at any time obli 
gated to spend any County funds raised from taxation 
for the project or for the payment of the bonds. Tlw 
face of the bonds themselves will bear this plain restric-
tion (11-17-4(1) ). No one is misled, no debt or liability 
of the County is created. 
Appellant recognizes the applicability of the special 
fund rule, but argues it might be violated if a connt.1 
mortgaged property acquired from tax money to secur1' 
industrial revenue bonds. A sufficient answer is that 
this will not be the case here as no County funds ha1T 
been spent (Tr. 16, 22) and no property purchased by th 1' 
County from tax funds will be used for the project. If , 
any funds are spent, the County will be reimbursed oui 
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of thP bond proceeds (Ex. D-4, Sec. 4.3). If any county 
or municipality in the future attempted to use tax moneys 
or lffoperty purchased from tax moneys without reim-
hursernent from the bond proceeds, such county or mu-
nicipality would not be complying with the restrictions 
of the Act that a project or a bond issue would not be 
a charge against its general credit or taxing powers. In 
such a case a court could certainly prohibit the attempted 
transaction. This does not make the Act unconstitutional, 
but only makes unlawful the actions of a county or 
municipality which attempts to violate the Act. 
Thus we have here a new application of established 
principles of law, but while employed in a different way, 
the principles nevertheless remain the same. There is 
no violation of Utah Constitution, Article XIV, Sections 
3 and 4. 
POINT II 
THE ACT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A COUNTY OR 
CITY TO LEND ITS CREDIT IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 31, UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
rro date at least forty states have enacted some type 
of industrial promotion legislation. Most of these states 
prrmit the use of revenue bond programs to induce in-
dnstry to locate in their state. Only a very few of the 
aets have been found nnconstitntional (See Appendix C); 
one of these states (Nebraska) later reversed the deci-
~ion by adoption of a constitutional amendment. Wy-
111uing, a neighboring state with a constitution and an 
indnstrial revenue bond act similar to those in Utah 
l1a:-; itnh(•ld its act in three recent cases: Uhls v. State 
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ex rel. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 74; Reed v. City of 
Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 69; Powers v. City of Cheyenne, 435 
P.2d 448. The most recent decision upholding an indus-
trial revenue bond act is from Oregon: Carruthrrs v. 
Port of Astoria, 438 P.2d 725. For a list of cases uphold-
mg industrial revenue bond acts see Appendix A. 
Article VI, Section 31 was adopted after extensive 
debate in the Utah Constitutional Convention held in 
1895 and has remained unchanged to date. It reads as 
follows: 
The legislature shall not authorize the State 
or any county, city, town, township, district or 
other political subdivision of the state to lend 
its credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid 
of any railroad, telegraph or other private indi-
vidual or corporate enterprise or undertaking. 
A different ''lending of credit" article was first proposed 
to the convention by Brigham H. Roberts as follows: 
Neither the State of Utah nor any political 
subdivision thereof shall become a stockholder in 
or loan its credit to nor make any appropriation 
for the benefit of any person, company, associ-
ation or corporation, unless two-thirds of the 
qualified voters at a regular election to be Jwld ' 
shall assent thereto. (I Proceedings of Utah Con-
stitutional Convention 894, hereinafter cited as 
"Proceedings") 
Apparently because of objections to the possibility of 
lending of credit when two-thirds of the voter::; had ap-
proved, this proposal was not adopted. 
A second proposal by Mr. F,. S. Richards, more n'-
strictive than the one adopted, reads as follows: 
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No appropriation shall be made by this State 
nor any political subdivision thereof to any per-
son, corporation, association, or institution, not 
under the absolute control of the State, nor shall 
the State or any political subdivision thereof give, 
lend or pledge its credit for any such person, 
corporafaon, association or institution. (I Pro-
ceedings at 951) 
This proposal, too, was rejected. Note that the prohibi-
tion contained in both of these proposals - against the 
State or its political subdivisions making any appropri-
ation for the benefit of a private concern - was omitted 
from the article finally adopted. 
The debate over the Roberts proposal is recorded 
011 pages 894 to 929 of the Proceedings, and from pages 
951 to 1002 is found the debate on the Richards proposal 
and the proposal of C. S. Varian which was eventually 
adopted. 
Concerning the meaning of "lending of credit," dele-
gate David Evans, who supported the article which was 
adopted, said the following: 
vVhat is loaning the credit of a State or a 
county or a municipality? In short, it means that 
if any corporation or enterprise desiring to start 
a business and for the purpose of aiding it, the 
State endorses or rather guarantees the bond or 
paper of such individual or corporation .... (I 
Proceedings at 953) 
Samuel R. Thurman, one of our most distinguished 
eonstitntional framers, supported the final article and 
had the same understanding of the concept. He said: 
11 
It is not a question of the State being per-
mitted to make donations and give bonuses from 
time to time of the money that the State has in 
hand and under its immediate control, and that 
too, for purposes which the State believes to be 
a public benefit, but it is a question of mortgag-
ing the State, not for the payment of its own debt 
but for the payment of the debt of another. (I 
Proceedings 979) (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Thurman repeatedly ref erred to the idea that tlw 
Article's purpose was to prohibit the State or its politi-
cal subdivisions from guaranteeing the bonds and otlwr 
debts of private organizations. But Thurman and other 
delegates made it clear that they did not intend to pro-
hibit all aid or assistance to private enterprise. 
The evil feared by the framers was that the failure 
of private undertakings to which a state lent its credit 
would result in eventual resort to the taxing power of 
the State. This desire to prevent the use of the taxing 
power to pay private debts arose in a day when the rev1i-
nue bond, as distinguished from the general obligation 
bond, was virtually unknown. Revenue bonds do not 
involve governmental debt as does the general obligation 
bond. Revenue bonds under the Utah Industrial Facili-
ties Development Act are paid only with project reve-
nues; they therefore do not obligate the taxing power of 
the governmental unit issuing the bonds. ConsequPntl~­
the fears of the framers of the constitution that the 
taxing power of the State would be called upon do not 
exist under the Act we are concerned with here. 
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rr11e Iowa Court had a similar understanding of lend-
ing of credit when it said in a case involving industrial 
revenue bonds : 
What is meant herein by a loan of "credit"~ 
... This particular section of our Constitution 
was taken bodily from the Constitution of New 
York. As a part of the Constitution of New 
York, it was the result of past experience in the 
history not only of New York, but of other states 
as well, whereby aspiring new states had loaned 
their credjt freely and extravagantly to corporate 
enterprises which had in them much seductive 
promise of public good. These enterprises in-
cluded railways, canals, water powers, etc. The 
corporate body in each case was the primary 
debtor; the state bccanie the underwriter; it 
loaned its credit always with the assurance and 
bC'lief that the primary debtor woitld pay. Pur-
suant to the secondary liabilities, the state be-
came overwhelmed with millions of dollars of in-
debtedness which never would have been under-
taken as a primary indebtedness, and which never 
would liavP been permitted by public sentiment, 
if it had been known or believed that the second-
ary liability would become a primary one through 
the universal failure of the primary debtor. The 
ultimate cry of the surety is: I would not have 
become surety i f I had known or believed 
that I should have to pay the debt. This is as true 
of states as of individuals. It was to remove this 
del11sion of sitretyship with its snare of tempta-
tion that this section of the Constitution was adop-
ted. It withheld from the constituted authorities 
of the state all power or function of suretyship. 
Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.\V. 2d 5, 
14-15(Iowa19(14) (Emphasis added). 
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This same understanding that the "lending of credit" 
concept has no application when revenue bonds are in-
volved was expressed by the vVyoming Supreme Court 
as follows: 
If courts, which take opposite points of view 
relative to the lending of credit, can agree that 
revenue bonds such as those here involved are 
not a general liability of the city and are not 
subject to payment through the exercise of the 
taxing power, we ought to be justified in adhering 
to the principle that the legislature and bondhold-
ers themselves, and not the courts, will be respon-
sible for whatever results from this type of finan-
cmg. 
We have to recognize the inherent right of 
parties to contract as they see fit. If a bond pur-
chaser, with his eyes wide open, sees fit to pilr-
chase revenite bonds ... for the sake of a Federal 
tax advantage, he certainly will be on notice of 
the fact that there will never be any pecuniary 
liability aga1:nst the City ... and that he will be 
able to look only to the revenues of the project 
and the project property itself for payment of hi8 
bonds. With it expressed clearly in the law and 
on the face of each bond that neither the credit 
nor taxing power of the municipality is pledged, 
no bondholder will ever be heard to say he was 
deceived or that he thought otherwise. 
The constitutional provision we are discn~~­
ing precludes a city from loaning or giving it~ 
credit to or in aid of an individual or corporation. 
This does not prohibit a city from aiding or lJC11e-
fiting a corporation, if its credit is not involved. 
Licenses and franchises are frequently granted 
by cities and counties to individuals and corpora-
tions. No doubt the recipients receive aid and a 
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benefit, bitt no public credit is involved. Uhls v. 
State, sitpra at 83 (Empasis added). 
The Oregon Supreme Court expressed it this way: 
[T]he rev(~nue bond method of financing could 
not have been in the ken of the constitution writ-
ers .... The only conclusion that can be drawn 
from history is that they were looking for a way 
... to prevent exposing the sources of public reve-
nue to potential hazard. Carntthcrs v. Port of As-
toria, sitpra, at 728. 
rrhP quotes by the Appellant from statements of 
delegates Y arian and Richards were made in the con-
text of a discussion of the use of general obligation bonds 
or the nse of state suretyship of private bonds, either of 
which involves the use of the taxing pm:ver. The quoted 
conunents of both delegates refer to the evil sought to 
be ended by the lending of credit proviso - ultimate re-
sort to the taxing power if a financed project fails. Con-
sidered in context neither dPlegate was asserting that 
no aid or assistance should ever be given to private indus-
tr~'· rrhis is done in many ways by all governments, rang-
ing from assistance in the form of research on industrial 
problems, providing workmen's compensation insurance 
through the State Insurance Fund and, of course, broadly 
::;peaking, providing the framework of government within 
which private industry itself operates. But where there 
is no resort to the taxing power, there is no lending of 
cn•dit. This is the case here because the Act (11-17-4) 
lJl'Ohibits any such recourse as does the mortgage and 
ind<'nture involving this particular project (Ex. D-5). 
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Appellant insists that if bonds are not paid when 
due, the credit of the County will be impaired and relies 
on dictum from Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, supra. 
As dictum, the language quoted is not persuasive prece-
dent and in fact the recognition in that case of the 
special fund doctrine supports Respondents' position. It 
should be noted that the credit of Tooele County would 
in no way be impaired if there were a failure to pay the 
rentals on The Magnesium Project lease. \Vhen the bonds 
are initially marketed they are not sold on the basis of 
the credit of the municipality as Appellant alleges. The 
record shows instead that revenue bonds are sold on the 
basis of the financial strength of the company or com-
panies backing the project (Tr. 34). If a failure occurs, 
the only credit rating that would be injured vwuld be 
that of the private company for whom the project was 
constructed and any private guarantors of the payment 
of the bonds. 
In addition, contrary to the dictum of Justice Fol-
land in the lVadsworth case that "no prudent city will 
permit its promise to pay to go unfulfilled where it has 
received and enjoyed the fruits of the obligation," a mort 
recent Utah case has held that only a legal obligation 
and charge against the city can be paid by the city. In 
State v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527, this 
court held that even though the city had sold and used 
the proceeds of bonds which the court declared were il 
legal and thus "enjoyed the fruits of the obligation,'' the 
city could not be compelled to repay the bond purchasers. 
Thus Tooele County, here, could insist on the strict appll-
cation of the provisions of the Act and of the mortgage 
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and indenture relating to this project and refuse to make 
payment of the bonds even if they went into default. 
[ndeed it is not an overstatement to say that the courts 
would prohibit the County from attempting to repay any 
of the bonds since the County has no legal obligation to 
do so. 
Appellant quotes from the Ohio case of State v. 
Brand, 197 N.E.2d 328 to the effect that the borrowing 
power of the state would be lessened and thus the burden 
on the tax power of the state would be greater. This 
theory cannot be assumed without evidence and economic 
analysis. Appellant has made no showing that the bor-
rowing power of the state will be lessened nor has he 
related a lessened borrowing power to a greater burden 
on the taxing power. (It would appear that the burden 
of taxes would be less over the long run if there were 
no borrowing). The trial did establish instead that the 
revenue bonds would be issued not on the credit rating 
of the County but on the credit rating of the private com-
panies involved in the project. If the project were to 
fail, only the credit of the companies and its private 
guarantors would be affected. Thus the suggestion in 
Appellant's brief that interest rates on other tax free 
honds "likely will be increased" and that governmental 
nnits "may have to pay higher rates of interest on 'legiti-
1uate' bonds issued to finance public improvements" be-
eanse of the use of industrial revenue bonds are merely 
unsupported suppositions. Even if this were the case, 
1l1at would not involve a lending of credit in the consti-
tutional sense, for revenue bonds are neither a charge 
:1gainst any tax moneys or an obligation payable directly 
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or indirectly out of tax moneys. To the extent that thP 
Idaho, Ohio and Nebraska Supreme Courts reached con-
trary views in the cases cited by Appellant, we disagree 
with the conclusions reached and point out, again, that 
these cases stand alone against the many other cases :mp-
porting this type of financing. 
It is, of course, true that the financing cost is les~ 
on thPse type of bonds because nnder present federal 
income tax laws and by the provisions of the Act (11-17-
10) interest on these bonds is exempt from income tax-
ation. Furthermore, the record indicates that in some 
cases perhaps a greater percentage of the cost of a proj-
ect conld be financed (Tr. 73), but neither of these ad-
vantages involve in any way an obligation assumed by 
the state or any county or city. The name of the County 
as the issncr of the bonds is certainly not the same as 
the use of its credit. 
As discussed above, the "lending of credit" sought 
to be prohibited by the framers of the Utah constitution 
was public suretyship of private securities or assumption 
of private obligations by the public 'vith the resulting 
resort to the taxing power of the public agency in tlw 
event of private failures. rrhe framers showed no int<•nt 
that "lending of credit" vvas to have the expanded nwan-
ing suggested by the Idaho and Nebraska cases. On the 
contrary, "lending of credit" is not involved in rewnui· 
bond financing and the framers intended that private· 
enterprise could be be>nefitted hy public action wlwn 
lending of credit is not involved. This court should foll<n1· 
the intent of the framers of our constitution by finding 
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tl1at when no resort can he had to the taxing power of 
tlw puhlic agency, Toot>le County in this case, there is 
no violation of Article VI, Section 31. 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC PURPOSE FOR 
THE ACT. 
In many of the cases involving industrial promotion 
legislation, attacks have been made on the basis that the 
legislation involves a use of public agencies or public 
funds or public property in furtherance of private pur-
poses and, thus, it is not for a "public purpose." Some-
timPs this principle is asserted to be founded in the 
"lending of credit" provisions of state constitutions. 
Other courts discuss it in terms of a general constitu-
tional principle that there is a public sphere within which 
the legislature may act and a private sphere in which 
the legislature may not act. Still other courts discuss this 
in terms of an application of the "due process" clauses 
of state constitutions and of the United States Constitu-
tion. See Noh>, 1967 Utah Law Review 455; 19 Vand. L. 
Rev. 25 (1965). 
rrhe lending of credit provision of our constitution 
is discussed in Point II of this brief, where we pointed 
out there is no lending of credit because the Act involves 
only revt>nue bonds which do not obligate the credit of 
th<· County and which do not permit any charge on the 
taxing power. There being no lending of credit, we need 
not then go to the question of whether there can be a 
lending of credit if it is for a public purpose as was 
~nggested in the cases of Bailey v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 
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184, 240 Pac. 454, and Wallberg v. Utah Pitblic Welfare 
Comm., 115 Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935. In the former case 
this court found a public purpose when public fun<l.s 
were used to assist the farming industry by the employ-
ment of county farm agents and, in the latter case, that 
Article VI, Sec. 31, was not violated by the imposition 
of a lien on land ovmed by recipients of public welfare. 
Both statutes were held to be for a valid public purpose. 
With respect to the argument that there is an im-
plied constitutional limitation on the powers of the legis-
lature, we suggest that this is wholly foreign to previous 
interpretations of our state constitution by this court. 
In Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359, 37 4 P.2d 516, this court 
stated: 
Our Legislature is directly representative of 
the people of the sovereign state, and thus had in-
herently all of the powers of government excevt 
as otherwise specified by the State Constitution . 
. . . Therefore, it can do any act or perform any 
function of government not specifically prohibited 
by the State Constitution. 
Our state constitution being then a limitation on power, 
not a grant of power, there is no possibility of implied 
constitutional limitations of the kind suggested. 
The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitu 
tion was formerly used in several cases to strike doWll 
state legistlation. See, for example, Loan Ass'n v. To-
peka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875). But recent cases have held that 
state legislatures may properly enact economic legisl11· 
tion which regulates the property rights of its citizens. 
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Carmichael v. Soitthern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 
SL L.Ed. 1245 (1937). This deference to legislative judg-
ment is illustrated in a case involving an industrial pro-
motion act enacted by the State of Mississippi in which 
the United States Supreme Court found no substantial 
federal question to be involved (Albritton v. City of 
Winona, 303 U.S. 627). It appears clear that the present 
cas~: does not present any issue under the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution except, possibly, 
on the question of the tax exemption provisions of the 
Act, which are discussed in Point V of this brief. 
Turning next to public purpose as a part of due 
process under state constitutions, most state courts have 
had no difficulty in finding a public purpose sustaining 
industrial development legislation (Roe v. K ervick, 42 
N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834; City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 
l\fich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460; Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 
G7, 334 S:\V .2d 633; Roan v. Connecticut Indi1,strial Build-
ing Commission, 189 A.2d 399; Carruthers v. Port of As-
toria, supra. See other cases collected in Appendix B). 
There is a clear trend toward reversing the 19th Century 
<lodrines of limitations on the legislature (e.g. Sharpless 
u. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Arn. Dec. 759 
(1853)) to the modern recognition that state government 
i11 the exercise of its police powers must consider and 
become involved in the economic aspects of our society 
for the general welfare of all. As the Delaware court 
~tatPd: 
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions, we 
think, demonstrate a growing tendency on the 
part of lPgislatures and courts to expand the con-
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cept of public purpose beyond the narrow limits 
represented by the earlier decisions .... In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366, 177 A.2d 205, 
at 214. 
There is also a firmly established rule that courts defer 
to the determination of the legislature as to what i8 a 
proper public purpose and what type of legislation is 
needed for the public good. Courts will intervene only in 
a "plain case of departure from every public purpose 
which could reasonably be conceived." (Carmichael v. 
Southern Coal and Coke Co., supra). See also, Albritton 
v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799; State v. 
City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71. In Faul-
coner v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80, 
the rule was stated as follows: 
In enacting the statute under which the pres-
ent venture is undertaken, the legislature deemed 
the acquisition and ownership by a city of an 
"industrial building" to be a public project. Tlw 
legislative determination of what is a public pur-
pose will not be interfered with by the courts 
unless the judicial mind concedes it be without 
reasonable relation to the public interest or wel-
fare and to be within the scope of legitimate gov-
ernment. The consensus of modern legislative anJ 
judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of actiYi-
ties which may be classed as involving a publir 
purpose .... It reaches perhaps its broadest 
extent under the view that economic welfare is om 
of the main concerns of city, state and the federal 
governments. 
This general principle is in line with earlier deci-
sions of this court. In Lehi City v. M eiling, 87 U tall 237, 
48 P.2d 530, this court stated: 
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It is one of the objects of government to pro-
mote the public ~welfare of the state and provide 
for the material prosperity of its people. It is for 
the Legislature to determine the manner and ex-
tent to which it will exercise this function of 
government, and its determination upon that point 
is limited by its own discretion, and is beyond the 
interference of the courts. Id., 48 P.2d at 535. 
In the instant case there is ample evidence to show 
that in passing the Act the Legislature was acting within 
its proper sphere in promoting and protecting the public 
health, welfare and morals. The Act is referred to as 
relating to "industrial development," and Section 1 of 
the Act specifies that it "shall be for the purpose of 
achieving greater industrial development in the State of 
Utah." The trial court found that a valid and substantial 
public purpose was contemplated by the Legislature in 
the enactment of the Act (Findings, para. 15) and by the 
8oard of Commissioners of Tooele County in its proposed 
implementation of the provisions of the Act (Findings, 
para. 13). 
Following the doctrine set forth in Lehi City v. 
M eiling, supra, this court should uphold the legislation, 
indulging the usual presumptions in its favor. Certainly 
the enactment here is not a "clear and demonstrable 
mmrpation of power" (Lehi City v. M eiling, 48 P.2d at 
535) which the court should invalidate. The trial court's 
finding that "there is a valid and substantial public pur-
pose and public benefit to the County subserved by the 
issuance of the proposed revenue bonds and the con-
1<trnction of the project from the proceeds of the sale 
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thereof" (Finding, para. 14) directly corroborates the 
legislature's exercise of its discretion. For this reason, 
we shall only briefly highlight the supporting evidence 
on this point in the record. 
The evidence shows that between $50 million and 
$60 million will be spent in initial construction of the 
project, including some $10 million of supplies to be ob-
tained from Utah sources; that peak employment during 
construction will be between 800 and 1,000 construction 
workers and that the plant, when in operation, will re-
quire 300 employees with an annual payroll of $3,360,000 
or $2,960,000 after fringe benefits are deducted (Tr. 27-
28, 53, 57; Ex. D-13). Yearly purchases from Utah 
sources will amount to $3,230,000 (Exs. D-6, D-11, D-12). 
Professor Iver Bradley of the University of Utah, an 
experienced statistician and economist, applied the re-
sults of his economic research to these figures and deter-
mined that the wage payments and Utah purchases of 
supplies by the project will increase the total yearly 
household income to Utah households by $6,760,000 (Tr. 
53; Ex. D-12) and that the project payroll will repre-
sent a 32% increase in the wages paid in Utah in the 
chemical manufacturing sector of our economy (Tr. 55; 
Ex. D-13). Additional economic benefits not measured 
by the study will be derived from expenditures of $2 
million in the state each year for electrical energy (Tr. 
29, 54); transportation expenditures (Tr. 30, 54); expen-
ditures of approximately $500,000 a year in state and 
local taxes and $163,000 per year in state land rentals 
and royalties (Tr. 31, 58), and the spurt to tll(~ economy 
caused by the initial construction of the project err. 57-
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58). It is also likely that new industries using magnesium, 
chlorine, gypsum and other by-products produced by The 
Magnesium Project will locate in Utah (Tr. 31, 54). 
The economic benefits above referred to become even 
more significant when the present Utah and Tooele Coun-
ty economies are observed. Commissioner R. Sterling 
Halladay, of the Board of Commissioners of Tooele 
County, testified (Tr. 19-20): 
THE vVITNESS: The employment in our Coun-
ty, we're very much concerned. A very high 
percent of our employment is Federal employ-
ment, while our economy is good because [of 
the present] employment that we enjoy, it 
could be wiped out by the stroke of a pen 
overnight, and we would be in a very bad 
circumstance, both with regards to the pri-
vate individual, as well as all of our munici-
palities and your county government is con-
cerned. I'm not sure as to the percentage of 
Federal employment, but I'm - it must be 
over 50% Federal employment here in this 
county [Exhibit D-16 shows that over 80% 
of the wage and salary payments in the years 
1962 to 1965 came from government sources]. 
Professor R. Thayne Robson, of the University of 
Utah Bureau of Economic and Business Research, testi-
fied that the economy of the State of Utah needs to 
grow by 14,000 to 15,000 new jobs a year to absorb the 
normal increase in the labor force and to re-employ 
}Jersons displaced in other industries and should grow by 
15,000 to 18,000 jobs per year to provide the needed 
growth rate for Utah's econom~'. Over the past 5 years 
the economy has not grffwn sufficiently to absorb these 
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normal increases and, consequently, there has been a 
substantial migration out of the state to find jobs (Tr. 
78-79). 
In Tooele County more of the personal income 
(84.4%) comes from wages and salaries than in the state 
as a whole (69.7% ), and government accounts for 69.9% 
of the total as compared to a state-wide average of 
19.6% (Ex. D-14). Similar information is shown on Ex-
hibits D-15 and D-16. Exhibits D-17 and D-18 indicate 
the relatively small share of the Tooele County economy 
occupied by manufacturing with the actual number of 
manufacturing establishments declining between 1958 and 
1963 and the number employed in manufacturing being 
less in 1963 than in 1939. Other information on Tooele 
County is shown on Exhibits D-19 and D-20 relating to 
taxes and Exhibit D-21 relating to some aspects of the 
Tooele population. 
Professor Robson also testified that the short-term 
effect of The Magnesium Project during the construction 
period "would be a great boost and boom for the Utah 
economy" (Tr. 85) and that the long-term effect on 
Tooele County and the State of Utah "would be very 
substantial and very significant" (Tr. 86). 
Certainly on this evidence and similar evidence re-
lating to the State as a whole, the Tooele County Com-
mission and the Legislature of the State of Utah were 
reasonable in concluding that financing of private in-
dustry through the use of industrial revenue bonds was 
a proper public activity and for the public benefit. Au-
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thorization of use of these income tax exempt revenue 
bonds affords a relatively simple means by which the 
goals of private industry and public bodies can be accom-
plished to their mutual benefit. We need not and do 
not in this case contend that this legislation is a panacea 
for all the economic problems of the State or of Tooele 
County, but clearly if this legislation is upheld it does 
place Utah on an even basis with other states in the 
competition for new jobs and increased economic pros-
perity (Tr. 71). There is a proper public purpose m 
this type of legislation and it should be sustained. 
POINT IV 
THE ACT PROPERLY DELEGATES POWERS TO 
CITIES AND COUNTIES, APPLIES UNIFORMLY, 
GRANTS NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, DELEGATES 
TO NO SPECIAL COMMISSION AND REQUIRES 
BOND PROCEEDS TO BE USED FOR PROPER 
PURPOSES. 
Appellant in Points II, III and VI of his brief al-
leges violation of several constitutional provisions which 
we ~will discuss under this general point. 
(A) Delegation of Pou;ers. Unless specifically lim-
ited by the state constitution, the legislature has all 
powers of government (vVood 1'. Budge, supra; Lehi City 
v. Jlfeiling, s1tpra; Salt Lalce City v. Christensen Co., 34 
Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 898). In exercis-
ing this power, it can delegate to cities and counties such 
authority as it deems advisable. This does not violate any 
Rl"Jmration of powers concept of Article V, Section 1, 
for the cities and counties within the scope of their dele-
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gated powers act as arms of the state. This court stated 
in Nowers v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 P.2d 108 at 113: 
County Commissioners are legislative as well as 
executive bodies. The delegation of legislative or 
quasi legislative powers to such a body could not 
be questioned .... 
vVith regard to cities, the legislature is not restricted 
to the subjects set forth in Article XI, Section 5. This 
court stated in Wadsworth v. Santaqitin City, sitpra, 28 
P.2d at 168-69: 
The power granted in the amendment [to 
Article XI, Section 5] to cities forming their own 
charters, while taking such cities out of the orbit 
of le.gislative action as to municipal and local 
affairs, is no limitation on the power of the legis-
lature with respect to the organization of other 
cities and the conferring of power on them by 
general law. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the lack of specific reference 
to industrial revenue bond financing in Article XI, Sec-
tion 5, negates the existence of such authority. ThP 
legislature can supply this authority which it has donr 
by the adoption of the Act here in question. Na nee r. 
Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773, 
does not conflict with this conclusion for the holding there 
was that a city ordinance on civil rights was invalid be-
cause civil rights authority was neither granted by Arti-
cle XI, Section 5, nor was it authorized by any statute. 
This is not a holding that Article XI, Sec. 5 is the onl,v-
source of city powers. 
vVe recognize that a delegation by the legislatlu·(· 
must be limited by proper standards, but such standards 
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are set forth in the Act. The most basic of these is 
found in 11-17-1 that the Act is for the purpose of 
"achieving greater industrial development in the State 
of Utah." The city or county must act in promoting this 
purpose so as not to give rise to a general obligation or 
liability of the city or county or a charge against its 
general credit or taxing powers. It must act reasonably 
in determining appropriate terms for the leases, provid-
ing for adequate security for the bonds, providing for 
proper disposition of the proceeds of the bonds and car-
rying out the purposes of the Act for the public benefit 
of the municipality or county involved. Necessarily, the 
municipality or county must be granted considerable 
discretion, for these projects will vary greatly in type 
and extent. Lease provisions applicable in one situation 
may not be appropriate in another. Similar discretion 
is exercised by officials of cities and counties every day 
nndcr various statutes and in various circumstances. See 
Tltah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, supra, 74 P.2d 
at 1196. 
Appellant specifically points to the fact that the Act 
fails to provide the maximum price at which revenue 
bonds issued under the Act may be sold or a maximum 
interest rate on the bonds. Since the bonds are not 
an obligation of the city or county and will be paid by 
the company involved in the project, it is entirely ap-
IJropriate for the legislature to permit the market place 
to determine the rate of interest and the price of the 
bonds. 
Section 11-17-3 of the Act provides that a project 
1nust be located ·within the State of Utah and "may be 
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located within or partially within" the municipality or 
county which is sponsoring the project. Appellant con-
tends this constitutes an improper delegation even though 
it is clear that the project here will be located entirely 
within Tooele County (Tr. 27). We see nothing wrong 
in permitting a city or county to so act so long as they 
act reasonably and within the purposes of the Act. Based 
on the evidence discussed in Point III, it would appear 
that the City of Tooele or the City of Grantsville will 
receive many of the benefits which will inure to Tooele 
County from the establishment of the project and should 
be permitted to sponsor such a project. If, however, 
Tooele County sponsored a project located near St. 
George, the County Commissioners might well be 
acting unreasonably and, thus, beyond the authority of 
the Act. \¥ e also note that the phrase could be con-
strued as requiring projects to be at least partially ·within 
the municipality or county. The phrase "may be locatrd 
within or partially within, such municipality or county" 
could be construed to mean that the municipality or 
county has discretion as to the two named alternatives, 
that is, either within or partially within but no other. 
We suggest but do not endorse such a construction, for 
we believe it would unduly and unnecessarily restrict the 
location of industry around cities and counties which 
benefit from the establishment of such an industrial 
project. 
The question of location and, indeed, the essence of 
the question of delegation is adequately answered by 
State v. City of Pittsbitrg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 at 
78-79. An industrial revenue bond act authorizing loca-
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tion of projects "in any city or its environs, without 
limitation as to distance" was not an improper delega-
tion, the court held. The legislature must fix general 
standards, but "the filling in of details must, in the very 
nature of things, be left to the local authorities." The 
conrt noted "the legislature and the people have the right 
to assume that public officials will exercise their express 
and implied powers fairly, honestly and reasonably." 
(B) Uniformity, No Special Privileges, Vagueness. 
Pointing to Article VI, Section 26 (private or special 
laws), or in Federal constitutional terms, equal protec-
tion of the laws, Appellant argues that the Act consti-
tutes special legislation. He asserts there is no reason-
able basis for the exclusion of public utilities as a project 
which could be financed under the Act and suggests that 
only telephone, electric and gas utilities are so excluded. 
We read Section 11-17-2(2) as excluding all public utili-
ties as defined in Section 54-2-1. A classification between 
public utilities and other types of business or industry 
is certainly reasonable and has been customarily recog-
nized. These types of companies traditionally subject to 
regulation by the Public Service Commission should con-
tinue to be so regulated and should not become involved 
with cities or counties in a project under the Act. Note, 
also, that the exclusion applies generally without excep-
tion to all utilities and thus operates uniformly. 
This also answers .. Acppellant's assertion that exemp-
tion of the revenue bonds from the Uniform Commercial 
Code violates the uniformity provisions. The Commer-
eial Code itself contains numerous exclusions from its 
operation. Here another exclusion applies to all bonds 
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issued under the Act and this is applied uniformly and 
equally without discrimination of any kind. This same 
reason justifies the exemption of projects under the Act 
from the competitive bidding laws plus the added reason 
that there is no need for competitive bidding when gov-
ernment does not pay the bill. "\Ve can assume that the 
private industry involved in the project, which is paying 
the bill, will see to it that the lowest possible prices for 
construction and for financing are obtained. 
Finally, Appellant contends that there is broad dis-
cretion given to a city or county as to what industry it 
would sponsor under the Act. The mere fact that a 
county is free to negotiate with whom it pleases does 
not violate any constitutional guarantee. The Act is 
general by its terms and would permit any industrial 
enterprise, except public utilities, to lease a project from 
the county. The county itself, as a subdivision of state 
government, is left with legislative powers which it may 
use in determining the method and procedure it will fol-
low in its use of the Act. See N owe rs v. Oakden, siipra, 
and see generally State v. ]}Jason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920; Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 U.2d 355, 
393 P.2d 391; 111 arqitardt v. Weber Coimty, 360 F.2d lGS. 
See also Note, 1967 Utah Law Review 431. In the latter 
two cases the courts held that the act in question was 
non-discriminatory in terms and there was no violation 
of equal protection guarantees as a result of discrimina-
tion in application of the act when the discrimination 
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was not "intentional and systematic." In State v. Demus, 
135 S.E. 2d 352 (vV. Va. 1964), industrial promotion legis-
lation was sustained, the court holding that there is no 
violation of equal protection guarantees even if some 
persons are incidentally benefitted more than others in 
achieving the purposes of the legislation. See also Green 
v. City of JJJt. Pleasant, supra; Roe v. Kervick, supra; 
and State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414. 
Appellant points to no particular provision of the 
Act which he considers vague, ambiguous or uncertain 
and our reading of the Act does not indicate any vague-
ness, ambiguity or uncertainty whatsoever. This court 
has established the rules concerning vagueness of stat-
utes in several cases inclr ..ding N owe rs v. Oakden, supra, 
(no unconstitutional vagueness if the Act "when con-
strned with related sections, conveys a definite meaning 
to 'those whose duty it is to execute it'") ; Kent Club v. 
Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870; Tygesen v. Magna 
Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127, 131 (Courts will 
not declare an act invalid "because it has not been ex-
pressed as aptly or clearly as it could have been had 
uifforent terms been used .... Only when it is impos-
sihle to resolve the donbts ·will an act be declared invalid 
for uncertainty or vagueness."). 
( C) I rr<'vocablc Franchise. On the basis of Article 
I, Se~. 23, Utah Constitution, Appellant objects to Sec-
tion 11-17-13 of the Act. This section merely provides 
that the legislature will not make changes in the Act 
whieh would affect outstanding bonds issued under the 
Act so as to "alter, m1pair or limit the rights thereby 
33 
vested until the bonds ... are fully met and discharged." 
But the provision goes on to make it clear that amend-
ments may be made "if and when adequate provision 
shall be made by law for the protection of the holders 
of the bonds or persons entering into contracts with any 
county or municipality." Thus the purpose and effect of 
the provision is not to grant an irrevocable franchise or 
privilege, but to reasonably protect contracts which have 
been made. Attempted amendments which would impair 
vested contract rights of bondholders or others would 
undonbtedly violate Article I, Section 18, Utah Consti-
tution. See also Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 
930, where a 99 year lease of state property was held 
not to constitute an irrevocable franchise, privilege or 
immunity. It would appear that Appellant concedes, and 
quite properly, that the principles of that case sustain 
leases made under the Act here in question. 
(D) Special Commissio11. Article VI, Section 29, 
Utah Constitution, prohibits delegation by the legislature 
to any special commission, corporation or association 
power to perform any municipal function. The municipal 
function under the Act here involved is to induce indus-
try to locate in the municipality by erecting a project, 
not to operate a project. Indeed the municipality or 
county is prohibited from operating a project. There is 
no delegation of any municipal function to a private com-
pany leasing property from the city or county under tl111 
Act since the company merely operates a plant erecte<l 
by a city or county which has performed its function of 
inducing industry to locate in the area. The compan: 
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w11ile operating property, title to which is vested in the 
county or municipality, in doing so pursuant to a lease, 
the terms of which are controlled by the county or mu-
nicipality. For the same reason there is no delegation 
to a trustee or receiver who might operate the property 
if a default occurs in the bonds. These same questions 
were discussed and a virtually identical constitutional 
provision was construed by the Wyoming Supreme Court 
in Uhls v. State, sitpra, 429 P.2d at 84-85. The court 
there held that this constitutional provision is designed 
"to protect against the exercise of the taxing power and 
other purely municipal functions by officials not subject 
to the people's control." This result is consistent with 
interpretations by this court of Article VI, Section 29. 
See Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Utah 536, 
271 Pac. 961 at 972. 
Also note that there is in reality no delegation under 
the Act except to municipalities and counties. Accord-
ingly, cases such as Carter v. Beaver County Service Area 
No. 1. 16 U.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440, Backman v. Salt Lake 
Cowdy, 13 U.2d 412, 375 P.2d 756, and State Water Pol-
lntion Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U.2d 247, 311 
P.2d 370, are distinguishable because in all those cases 
a special commission or district or state agency had been 
crPated to which powers had been delegated. The powers 
granted by the Industrial Facilities Development Act are 
granted without discrimination to "each municipality and 
each county." The Act thus does not constitute an inter-
fen•nce ·with a municipality or count~r, but extends a privi-
l<'g't' which is permissible as this court noted in Merkley 
c. State Tax Comm'n., 11 U.2d 336, 358 P.2d 991. 
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(E) Use of Borrowed Moneys. Article XIV, Section 
5, of the Utah Constitution is not violated by the Act. 
It requires moneys borrowed by a legal subdivision of 
the State to be used "solely for the purpose specified in 
the law authorizing the loan." The Act here expressly 
authorizes bond proceeds to be used only for industrial 
development. The lease and mortgage and indenture 
of trust, Exlubits D-4 and D-5, specifically require the 
Respondents to use the bond proceeds only for the pur-
poses specified in the Act which, in this case, will be con-
struction of this industrial project. Only if the bond 
proceeds are actually used for purposes not authorized 
by law will the constitutional provision be violated and, 
should that occur, the courts may take action to prohibit 
the diversion. There is obviously nothing in the Act 
itself which authorizes any diversion. 
POINT V 
PROPERLY INTERPRETED, THE ACT DOES NOT 
GRANT IMPERMISSIBLE TAX EXEMPTIONS. 
Section 11-17-10 of the Act provides as follows: 
All property acquired or held by the count:1 
or municipality under this act is declared to he 
public property used for essential public and gov-
ernmental purposes; and all such property and 
bonds issued under this act and the income from 
them are exempt from all taxes imposed by the 
state of Utah, any county, any municipality, or 
any other political snbdivison of the state. This 
exemption shall not extend to the interests of any 
private person, firm, association, partnership, cor-
poration or other private business entity in such 
property or in any other property such busines~ 
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entity may place upon or use in connection with 
any project, all of which shall be subject to the 
provisions of section 59-13-73 and all other ap-
plicable laws, nor to any income of such private 
business entity, which, except as provided in this 
section for such bonds and the income from them, 
shall be subject to all applicable laws regarding 
the taxing of such income. 
Appellant in Point V of his brief interprets the 
above section to grant at least a partial exemption from 
the property tax. This is a strained interpretation to 
reach a possibly unconstitutional result and violates the 
established canon of construction that laws should be 
interpreted to avoid constitutional questions. 
Consider for the moment the situation if the Act did 
not contain a section such as 11-17-10. Had that been 
true, the private company leasing an industrial plant 
and equipment from a city or county could very properly 
rlaim a property tax exemption for county owned prop-
erty as expressly provided in Article XIII, Section 2 of 
the Utah Constitution because the title to the plant and 
eqniprnent remains in the county or city until the bonds 
are paid and the options to purchase provided for in 
the lease are exercised. To avoid this result the legisla-
ture~ recognized the argument, but said instead that the 
private company would pay the same amount as it would 
otherwise pay in property tax by requiring application 
of Section 59-13-73 to the property the private company 
"may place upon or use in connection with any project." 
'rhP tax is "in the same amount and to the same extent 
a1; the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor 
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or user were the owner thereof" (59-13-74). A fair read-
ing of the privilege and use tax sections referred to make 
it clear that the value, tenure, title or ownership of the 
interest of the private business in the otherwise tax ex-
empt property is irrelevant and that the tax is imposed 
whenever there is possession or other beneficial use by 
a private party. This ·was the construction adopted by 
this court in Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 
supra, which case was relied on and approved in Mar-
quardt v. Weber County, 360 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1966). 
A similar "in lieu of property tax" provision was 
upheld in Powers v. City of Cheyenne, sitpra. Appellant's 
claim that "likely" the tax imposed would not be the 
same and that each individual assessor would apply the 
law differently can be answered simply by this court 
declaring that the tax under 59-13-73 is to be imposed 
on project lessees under the Act on the same basis as if 
the lessee were paying a property tax on property, title 
to which is owned by it. Our statute is is no way similar 
to the Virginia statute involved in Industrial Develop-
ment Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326, 
where the statute provided for rental payments in lieu 
of property taxes and granted the local authority pmver 
to agree "at any time" to a definite sum to be paid for 
such purpose. The opportunity for discrimination in such 
a statute is self-evident. 
Some states have granted a clear tax exemption 
which has been upheld. See State ·v. Demits, 135 R.E.2d 
352 (W.Va. 1964); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 
N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920. Utah chose, instead, to impose a 
38 
tax in lieu of property tax and to reqmre payment of 
the usnal corporate franchise tax on income. There can 
be no constitutional infirmity in this approach under 
Sections 2, 3, or 10 of Article XIII of the Utah Consti-
tution. Since there is no exemption, there is no discrimi-
nation or inequality which could raise any question under 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or under similar provisions of our state constitution. 
Appellant makes no objection to the exemption of 
the revenue bonds themselves from property taxation or 
to exemption of the interest on the revenue bonds from 
income taxation. Exemption of intangible property such 
as bonds from property taxation is expressly authorized 
by Article XIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution. 
Exemption from income tax of the interest on bonds is-
sued by municipalities and other governmental agencies 
is in line with long-standing state policy (See 59-14-4 
(2) ( d); 11-14-14) uniformly applied and the exemption 
in the Act is only a specific application of this general 
state policy. 
POINT VI 
INVESTMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN REVENUE 
BONDS ISSUED UNDER THE ACT IS PERMIS-
SIBLE. 
The trial court held that because the County had 
d(~termined not to purchase or invest in any of the bonds 
(Exhibit P-2) the question was not properly before the 
court and was not determined (Conclusions of Law, para. 
:\(a); Declaratory Judgment and Decree, para. 2). Ap-
pellant nonetheless raises the question again suggesting 
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that a state investment in these revenue bonds would 
constitute an assumption of the debt of a county con-
trary to Article XIV, Section 6, Utah Constitution. This 
ignores the plain fact of such a transaction that the state 
rather than assuming debt would become a creditor at 
the time of the purchase of the bonds, not a debtor. The 
state would not be obligated to pay the debt but as a 
creditor would receive interest and be entitled to receive 
the principal when it came due. Furthermore, because 
of the "special fund doctrine" referred to in POINT I, 
the County is not the debtor. The state, like any other 
bondholder, could look only to the revenues from the 
project for payment of the bond and the property com-
prising the project which is mortgaged as additional 
security. 
If Appellant intends to suggest that any investment 
by a public agency in securities, including securities which 
a private corporation is required to pay, is unconstitu-
tional, the claim was set to rest by this court in State 
Land Board v. State Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265, 
365 P.2d 213. Andres v. First Arkansas Development 
Finance Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W. 2d 97 upheld state 
investment in industrial development bonds. See also 
Industrial Development Aitthority v. Eastern Kentif;cky 
Regional Planning Conimission, 332 S.W.2d 27 4 and 
Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Inditstrial Development 
Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 291 S.W.2d 802. The authorization 
of investment by the act is no more than that intended 
in the statute considered in the Land Board case, and 
should be treated as such by this court. 
40 
If, however, the court is concerned with the consti-
tutionality of this section, it is clearly severable from 
the remainder of the Act. The primary purpose of the 
Act is to provide a financing method to induce private 
industry to locate in Utah. Enhanced marketability of the 
bonds issued to accomplish this purpose by permitting 
sale to public agencies is certainly a subordinate matter 
not essential to the major purpose of the Act and if de-
fective should be severed from the remainder of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we submit that the Utah 
Industrial Facilities Development Act is in all respects 
valid and constitutional and that the proposed actions of 
the respondents here in operating pursuant to this Act 
should be declared to be lawful in all respects. To arrive 
at this result the court need not and should not indulge 
in philosophical speculations as to the desirability of 
this type of legislation. That decision was made by the 
legislature which recognized that industrial development 
for this state is of vital concern. Had they felt other-
wise they would not have established in 1965 the Utah 
State Industrial Promotion Board, whose assignment 
is specifically to induce industry to locate in this state. 
11he Act here in question provides another tool with which 
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this Board can accomplish its purposes enabling it to 
compete on a more equal basjs with other states whose 
courts have already approved this type of legislation. 
We submit that the decision below should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. WALDO, JR. 
J. WENDELL BAYLES 
JONES, WALDO, HOL-
BROOK & McDONOUGH 
800 Walker Bank Buildjng 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GORDON HALL 
Tooele County Attorney 
Tooele County Courthouse 
Tooele, Utah 




The following is a list of cases upholding the con-
stitutionality of legislation authorizing industrial devel-










Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 
57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (no "lending of 
credit" when revenue bonds are issued) 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 256 Ala. 
162, 53 So. 2d 840 (1951) (no "lending 
of credit" when revenue bonds are is-
sued) 
Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 
633 (1960) (no "lending of credit" when 
revenue bonds are issued) 
Smith v. State, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113 
(1961) (by local constitutional amend-
ment) 
Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 
1184, 131 N.W.2d 5 (1964) (no "lending 
of credit" when revenue bonds are is-
sued) 
State ex rel. Ferguson v. City of Pitts-
burg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 (1961) 
(no "lending of credit" when revenue 
bonds are issued) 
Gregory v. City of Lewisport, 369 S.W.2d 
133 (Ky. 1963) (no "lending of credit" 
when revenue bonds are issued) 
Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 
232 S.W.2d 80 (1950) (no "lending of 
credit" when revenue bonds are issued) 
Hebert v. Police Jury, 200 So. 2d 877 
(La. 1967) (no "lending of credit" when 
revenue bonds are issued; constitutional 
authorization) 
Opinion of the Justices, 210 A.2d 683 (Me. 
1965) (limited approval) 
City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 
144 N.W.2d 460 (1966) (no "lending of 
credit" when revenue bonds are issued) 
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MISSOURI State ex rel. City of El Dorado Springs v. 
Holman, 363 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1962) 
(constitutional amendment authorizes 
both general obligation and revenue 
bonds) 
NEBRASKA State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancas-
ter, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962) 
(constitutional amendment authorizing 
industrial revenue bonds said by the 
court to be for private purposes) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE Opinion of the Justices, 209 A.2d 474 (N. 
H. 1965) 
NEW MEXICO Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 
18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956) 
NORTH DAKOTA Gripentrog v. City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W. 
2d 230 (N.D. 1964) 
OKLAHOMA Harrison v. Claybrook, 372 P.2d 602 (Okla. 
1962) 
OREGON Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, ____ Ore. ____ , 
438 P .2d 725 (1968) (no "lending of 
credit" when revenue bonds are issued) 
SOUTH CAROLINA Elliott v. McNair, ____ S.C. ____ , 156 S.E.2d 
TENNESSEE 
VIRGINIA 
421 (1967) (no "lending of credit" when 
revenue bonds are issued) 
West v. Industrial Development Bd., 206 
Tenn. 154, 332 S.W.2d 201 (1960) (no 
"lending of credit" when revenue bonds 
are issued) 
Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 
46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951) (no "lending 
of credit" when revenue bonds are is-
sued; distinguished two prior Tennessee 
cases holding unconstitutional general 
obligation bond programs) 
Fairfax County Indus. Dev. Auth'y v. 
Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87 
(1966) (no "lending of credit" when 
revenue bonds are issued) 
Industrial Dev. Auth'y of Chesapeake v. 





(1967) (constitutional except for tax 
provision) 
State ex rel. County Court v. Demus, 148 
W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352 (1964) (no 
"lending of credit" when revenue bonds 
are issued) 
State v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57, 148 N.W. 
2d 683 (1967) (no "lending of credit" 
when revenue bonds are issued) 
Uhls v. State, 429 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1967) 
(no "lending of credit" when revenue 
bonds are issued) 
Reed v. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 69 
(Wyo. 1967) (no "lending of credit" 
when revenue bonds are issued) 
Powers v. City of Cheyenne, 435 P.2d 448 
(Wyo. 1967) (no "lending of credit" 
when revenue bonds are issued) 
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APPENDIX B 
The following is a list of caseR which, in addition to 
those cases listed in Appendix A, have upheld legisla-
tion authorizing governmental programs of promoting 










Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 
So. 2d 175 (1950) 
De Armond v. Alaska State Development 
Corporation, 376 P.2d 717 (Alas. 1962) 
Myhand v. Erwin, 231 Ark. 444, 330 S.W. 
2d 68 (1959) 
Hackler v. Baker, 233 Ark. 690, 346 S.W. 
2d 677 ( 1961) (constitutional amend-
ment authorizes both general obligation 
and revenue bonds) 
Roan v. Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm'n, 
150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 ( 1963) 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366, 
177 A.2d 205 (1962) 
Industrial Dev. Auth'y v. Eastern Ky. Re-
gional Planning Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d 
274 (Ky. 1960) 
Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 
(Ky. 1956) 
Miller v. Police Jury, 266 La. 8, 74 So. 2d 
394 (1954) 
Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth'y v. Mea-
dow-Groft, 243 Md. 515, 221 A.2d 632 
(1966) 
City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 
136 A.2d 852 (1957) 
Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 
178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 
627 (1938) 
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NEW HAMPSHIRE Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169 
A.2d 634 ( 1961) 
NEW JERSEY Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 
(1964) 
TENNESSEE Mayor and Alderman of the City of Fay-
etteville v. Wilson, 212 Tenn. 55, 367 
S.W.2d 772 (1963) 
McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 
498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958) (found gen-
eral obligation bonds to be constitutional 
when used for public purposes arising 
out of a "virtual crisis") 
Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 202 
Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d 373 (1957) 
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APPENDIX C 
The following is a list of cases finding unconstitu-
tional legislation authorizing industrial development 
revenue bond financing* and which failed to find a pub-




State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 
779 (Fla. 1952) (dictum that there was 
a lending of credit when revenue bonds 
issued) 
Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. 
Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960) 
(Idaho Constitution is more restrictive 
than Utah Constitution as to "lending 
of credit" : "No [state] subdivision, 
shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith 
thereof directly or indirectly, in any 
manner, to, or in aid of any individual, 
association or corporation, for any 
amount or for any purpose whatever 
... " (Idaho Const. Art. 8 §4) 
State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 
223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957) (case over-
ruled by constitutional amendment; 
revenue bond program found constitu-
tional in case cited in Appendix A) 
NORTH CAROLINA Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial De-
velopment Financing Authority, .... N.C . 
... ., 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968) 
OHIO State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 
44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964) 
-x- A Maryland statute allowing a state industrial development 
agency to guarantee loans to private companies was found to 
violate the lending of credit proviso of the Maryland Constitution. 
Development Credit Corp. v. McKean, 237 A.2d 742 (Md. 1968). : 
A Georgia case, Smith v. State, 222 Ga. 552, 150 S.E.2d 868 (1966), 
held that a tax exemption granted by a state constitutional amendment 
violated due process and equal protection of federal fourteenth amend 
ment. 
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